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that bank capital must be at least 8 percent of a bank’s risk-weighted
assets.1 Also, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act
of 1991 (FDICIA) requires regulators to shut down a bank whose capital has
dropped below a cutoff level.
Whiletheseregulationsareimportant,theirfocusistoonarrowinthatthey
concentrate solely on equity. There are other types of ﬁnancial instruments
available, and these can be even more effective than capital requirements
at controlling risk. Proposals to require banks to issue subordinated debt
recognizethis,buteventhoseproposalsdonotmakefulluseofthepossibilities
available. This article argues that capital regulation can be improved by using
ﬁnancialinstrumentslikeconvertibledebtandwarrantswithhighstrikeprices.
Furthermore, some of the improvement brought about by these instruments
would allow a reduction in the traditional capital requirements.
Anyeconomicstudyofbankcapitalregulationrequiresatheoryofcapital
structure. Modern theories of corporate ﬁnancial structure start with the cele-
brated result of Modigliani and Miller (1958): that in a world without taxes or
bankruptcy costs, the value of a ﬁrm does not depend on its capital structure.
These theories then consider departures from the world of Modigliani and
Miller—departures that cause the capital structure to matter. The particular
departure studied in this article is agency theory. In the agency theory of cap-
ital structure, limited liability creates an incentive for highly leveraged ﬁrms
to take excessive risk. These incentives are made worse in banking because
The author would like to thank Kartik Athreya, Tom Humphrey, David Marshall, Roy Webb,
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sarily represent the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond or the Federal Reserve
System.
1 Recent proposals by the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision are still based on capital
requirements even though they change the way the requirements are calculated.
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of deposit insurance. This idea was developed by Merton (1977) and Kareken
and Wallace (1978) in the context of deposit insurance and is related to the
agencytheoryofcapitalstructuredevelopedbyJensenandMeckling(1976).2
The analysis presented in this article is a simpliﬁed exposition of the
analysis contained in Marshall and Prescott (2001). They examine the value
of augmenting capital regulations with securities that ﬁne-tune the payoff
received by a bank. In the Marshall and Prescott model, a bank chooses the
risk and mean characteristics of its loan portfolio. For reasons described later,
limited liability and government insured bank debt gives banks an incentive
to take risk. They ﬁnd that capital requirements are much more effective at
controlling risk taking if they are augmented with securities like warrants or
convertible debt. As in Green (1984), these latter instruments control risk
taking because they lower the net return to a bank when it performs extremely
well.
Thepresentarticle’sfocusoncontrollingrisktakingisparticularlyrelevant
to banking. The most striking example of a failure to control risk-taking
incentives is the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s. The standard story told
about this event is that the inﬂation of the 1970s lowered the value of the
savings and loans’ﬁxed rate mortgages to the point that many had a negative
net worth. Because of this negative net worth, the savings and loans had
nothing to lose by taking on lots of risk. The deregulation of the early 1980s
gave the savings and loans the opportunity to take on the risk, and many
failures throughout the 1980s resulted.3
There is additional evidence of excessive risk taking. Boyd and Gertler
(1994) argue that large banks, who had stronger deposit insurance protection
due to the “too big to fail” doctrine, took more risk than smaller banks during
the late 1980s, which was a period of widespread banking problems. Other
studies have found a connection between low capital levels and bank risk.
The survey in Berger, Herring, and Szego (1995) lists studies that imply that a
highercapitalratioisassociatedwithlowerbankrisk, thoughthisrelationship
is sometimes weak. On a related point, several researchers have found that
franchise value is negatively correlated with risk. Franchise value is the value
of continued operations by the bank and can represent organizational capital
or the present value of future lending opportunities. Failure of the bank would
mean a loss of its franchise value, which implies that high-franchise-value
2 For a survey on non-tax-driven theories of capital structure, see Harris and Raviv (1992).
3Another important part of this story is why so few banks failed from World War II until
the early 1980s. Keeley (1990) argues that in this period, banking was heavily regulated with
numerous protections that reduced competition. These protections included restricted entry by lim-
iting charters and branching, and limited price competition by interest rates controls. Because of
these protections, banks received a ﬂow of monopoly proﬁts that would be lost if the bank went
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banks would behave more prudently than low-franchise-value banks. Evi-
dence that in the 1990s U.S. banks with low franchise value took more risk
than those with high franchise value is contained in Demsetz, Saidenberg, and
Strahan (1996). In an international sample of banks, De Nicolo (2000) ﬁnds
that franchise value decreases and risk increases with bank size.
1. THE PURE DEBTAND EQUITY CASE
This section analyzes bank capital regulation when a bank is restricted to
issuing only debt and equity. This simple environment is useful for reviewing
corporate ﬁnance theory and for discussing bank regulation. It will also be
valuable in assessing the gain from introducing instruments like warrants into
bank capital regulation, as is done in Section 2.
A bank’s ﬁnancing problem is considered under three different sets of
assumptions. The ﬁrst set illustrates the Modigliani-Miller Theorem. The
second set of assumptions is based on the agency cost theory of Jensen and
Meckling(1976). Thepresentarticle,however,restrictsitsfocustotheagency
costofdebt; agencycostsofequityareignoredbecausethefocusondebtcosts
is all that is needed to illustrate the risk-control properties of warrants and
convertible debt.4 The ﬁnal set of assumptions adds deposit insurance to the
agency cost story; this set illustrates how deposit insurance creates additional
risk-taking incentives and how it shuts down the market’s incentive to control
the bank’s risk taking. Recent subordinated debt proposals are discussed.
Considerabankwithaninvestmentprojectthatrequiresexactlyonedollar
of investment. The risk-neutral owner or manager of the bank also has one
dollar of funds that he or she can either invest outside the bank at the risk-free
rateofzeroorholdasequityinthebank.5 Anyinvestmentnotfundedbyequity
mustbefundedbydebtthatisraisedfromthemarket. Forthepurposesofthis
article, the terms debt and deposits will be used interchangeably. Because of
limitedliability, debtholderscannotberepaidoutofthereturnstothebanker’s
market investments. Instead, if the face value of the debt cannot be repaid out
of the bank’s investment project, then the bank is liquidated and whatever is
left is used to pay the debtholders. Finally, since the exogenous risk-free rate
is zero, debtors must receive an expected gross return of 1.0 on their debt.
Afterraisingtheinvestmentfunds,thebankchoosesoneoftwoinvestment
strategies. It can choose a high-mean, low-risk strategy or a low-mean, high-
risk one. The high-mean strategy has a one-half probability of paying 0.5
4 Marshall and Prescott (2001) contains additional features that generate an agency cost for
equity.
5 The treatment of equity owners and managers as the same entity is common in the corporate
ﬁnance literature. This assumption, however, is not without consequences. Even so, the analysis
in this article should still apply to managerial pay.38 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
and a one-half probability of paying 1.5. In expectation this strategy pays
1.0, which is the risk-free gross return. The low-mean strategy has a one-half




that it will take. Let D be the amount of debt raised and let F be the face
value of the debt, or the amount the bank repays if it has the available funds.
Also, let I be the amount of funds invested in the market by the banker. Of
course, for each dollar of own funds invested in the market, the banker has to
raise one dollar in debt; therefore, D = I in this environment.
If the bank commits to the safe, high-mean investment strategy, then for
debt D ≤ 0.5 the bank always has enough funds to pay back debtholders. In
this case, F = D and the banker’s expected payoff is
0.5(0.5 − D)+ 0.5(1.5 − D)+ I = 1. (1)
For debt in the range 0.5 <D≤ 1.0, the bank cannot fully pay back the
depositors if it produces the low return. To compensate for this loss, the face
value of debt needs to reﬂect a risk premium. The risk premium depends on
the amount of debt issued. In particular, the face value of debt must satisfy
(0.5)(0.5)+(0.5)F = D, whichimpliesthatF = 2D−0.5. Therefore, ifthe
bank’s investment project is entirely ﬁnanced with debt, that is, if D = 1.0,
then the face value of the debt would be 1.5. If the bank fails the debtholders
receive 0.5, and if it succeeds they receive 1.5, which in expectation is 1.0, the
risk-free rate.
For 0.5 <D≤ 1.0, the bank’s expected payoff is
0.5(0.0) + 0.5(1.5 − 2D + 0.5) + I = 1, (2)
which is the same level as if it issued debt such that it never defaulted.
Similarcalculationsfortheriskyinvestmentstrategyrevealthatthebank’s
expected payoff of committing to that strategy is also independent of the debt
and equity structure, though the bank’s expected payoff is at the lower value
of 0.925. The value of the ﬁrm depends only on its investment decision, and
itscapitalstructurehasnoeffectonitsinvestmentdecision. Thisinvarianceof
the value of the ﬁrm to its ﬁnancing decision is an example of the Modigliani-
Miller theorem (Modigliani and Miller 1958).
6 Implicit in the analysis is the assumption that the bank must make an investment decision;
that is, it cannot simply invest its funds in the market and not operate. This assumption prevents
the trivial regulatory solution of shutting the bank down, and it is only necessary because the
bank’s return under the high-mean strategy is the same as that of the market and this is a linear
partial equilibrium model. In a general equilibrium model with some diminishing returns, the
expected returns would be equal in equilibrium and the banking sector would still operate.E. S. Prescott: Regulating Bank Capital Structure 39
Jensen and Meckling
For the second set of assumptions, I assume that a bank’s investment decision
is private information, that is, known only to the bank. Jensen and Meckling
(1976) use this assumption to establish a connection between the investment
and ﬁnancing decisions of a bank.7 Under private information, a bank cannot
commit to its investment strategy. Instead, given its capital structure, an
investment strategy must be in the best interest of the bank, that is, incentive
compatible. Of course, the market anticipates the bank’s inability to commit
and the price of debt will reﬂect whichever strategy the bank is expected to
choose given its debt structure.
There are three distinct ranges of debt to analyze. If D ≤ 0.25, then the
bank can always honor its obligations no matter which investment strategy it
chooses. Forthiscase,theanalysisisthesameasthatintheModigliani-Miller
case. The face value of debt is F = D. The bank owner receives a payoff
of 1.0 by taking the high-mean strategy and 0.925 by taking the low-mean
strategy, so he or she takes the safe strategy.
For the second debt range, of 0.25 <D≤ 0.5, there is no failure if the
bank takes the safe, high-mean strategy. In this case F = D and the bank’s
returnis1.0asbefore;however,becauseoftheprivateinformationassumption,
itmustnowbeveriﬁedthatthisstrategyisincentivecompatible. Wetherefore
need to calculate the bank’s expected payoff from issuing this debt contract
and taking the low-mean, risky investment strategy. If this number is less than
or equal to 1.0, then the safe strategy is incentive compatible; if it is greater
than 1.0, then it is not. In this case, the market will recognize that under
this debt structure the bank takes the risky strategy and it will price the debt
accordingly.
When the market thinks the bank is taking the safe strategy but it is really
taking the risky strategy, the bank’s return is
0.5(0) + 0.5(1.6 − F)+ I = 0.8 − 0.5F + I = 0.8 + 0.5D. (3)
For D ≤ 0.4, the value of equation (3) is less than or equal to 1.0 (what the
bank receives from taking the safe strategy), so the safe strategy is incentive
compatible. Above 0.4, however, the value of equation (3) is greater than 1.0,
so at these debt levels the safe strategy is not incentive compatible.
Figure 1 illustrates the risk-taking incentives created by limited liability.
The solid line is the bank’s payoff as a function of the return given that the
bank has raised D = 0.50 and that the market assumes that the bank is taking
the safe strategy, that is, F = D. The payoff function is piecewise linear and
convex because of limited liability. This convex shape generates a taste for
riskonthepartofthebank. Ifthebanktakesthesafestrategy,itspayoffsrange
7 Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) analysis applies to all ﬁrms, not just to banks.40 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 1 Risk-Taking Incentives Created by High Levels of Debt
The solid line is the bank’s payoff as a function of the return given that D = 0.5. It is
horizontal over the range 0.0 to 0.5 because of limited liability. Above 0.5, the slope of
the line is 1.0 because once the debt is repaid all returns above 0.5 accrue to the bank.
The dashed line connects the two possible returns (0.25 and 1.6) if the risky investment
is taken. The ﬁrst coordinate of x (0.925) is the expected return if the risky strategy is
taken. The second coordinate of x (1.05) is the bank’s expected payoff. The ﬁrst and
second coordinates of * are the corresponding values if the bank takes the safe strategy.
over a linear portion of the returns (over 0.5 and 1.5) and the bank’s expected
payoff is 1.0, just like that of the investment project. In contrast, if the bank
takes the risky strategy, it gains from the convexity. Consider the dashed line
in Figure 1, which connects the payoff from the two returns produced by the
risky strategy (0.25 and 1.6). Because of limited liability, a return of 0.25
gives the bank a payoff of 0.5 (the return on its market investment). The
convex payoff function rewards a bank on the upside without punishing it
on the downside, and this payoff structure is reﬂected in its higher expected
payoff of 1.05, despite producing a socially inefﬁcient investment return of
only 0.925, as indicated by the x in Figure 1.
Of course, for 0.4 <D≤ 0.5, the market realizes that the safe strategy
is not incentive compatible, and it prices the bank’s debt as if it has taken the
risky strategy. Thus, if the bank takes the risky strategy, the face value of the
debt is F = 2D − 0.25 and the bank’s expected payoff is 0.925.E. S. Prescott: Regulating Bank Capital Structure 41
The ﬁnal range of debt levels is D>0.5. For this range, there is a chance
of default even if the safe strategy is taken. This changes the formula for
the face value of the debt, but the high-mean strategy is still not incentive
compatible for the same reasons described earlier in relation to the second
range of debt levels. Consequently, the bank will choose the risky strategy so
the face value of debt is F = 2D − 0.25 and the bank’s expected payoff is
0.925.
Market Responses
Given these expected payoffs, the bank will choose a capital structure with
D ≤ 0.4 and then take the safe, high-mean strategy. The value of the ﬁrm
is 1.0, the expected payoff of the safe, high-mean strategy. For higher levels
of debt, the market realizes that the bank cannot commit to the safe strategy.
Consequently, it prices the debt as if it were taking the risky strategy. The
value of the bank for these debt levels is 0.925, the expected payoff of the
risky, low-mean strategy. In the world of Jensen and Meckling (1976), the
value of a ﬁrm is not invariant to its capital structure.
Debtpricesarenottheonlyareainwhichamarketmayrespondtocapital
structure. For example, debt contracts often include covenants that restrict
borrower activities or trigger call options. The market also may decide to
spendresourcesmonitoringtheborrower. Alloftheseactivitiescanbeviewed
as costly methods for reducing the adverse effects of private information. In
thepresentarticle, withnocoststoequitytheseunmodeledadditionalfeatures
are not needed, but in more general environments they very well may be. I
will return to this issue below in the discussion of bank regulation.
Deposit Insurance
The ﬁnal set of assumptions I consider is the addition of deposit insurance to
the agency theory of Jensen and Meckling (1976). In practice, deposits (up
to a limit) are the only debt explicitly insured. But bailouts may implicitly
insure other types of bank debt. To keep the analysis simple, I assume that
all bank debt is insured in one way or another. Insurance in this context
means that if the bank does not have enough funds to pay back debtholders,
the government insurer will make them whole. More speciﬁcally, insurance
means that debtholders always receive a payment of D, so the face value
of the debt is F = D. I also assume that the government provides deposit
insurance for free. This assumption is a reasonable approximation of present
FDIC policies. My analysis in this section is quite similar to that done under
the second set of assumptions, which had no deposit insurance, but now the
government insurance also leads to transfers to the bank via underpriced debt.42 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
For D ≤ 0.25 the bank can always pay back debtholders, so there is no
incentive problem and the analysis is the same as under the ﬁrst two sets of
assumptions. The bank’s expected payoff is 1.0 if it takes the safe strategy
and 0.925 if it takes the risky strategy. Consequently, it will choose the safe
strategy.
For 0.25 <D≤ 0.5 most of the analysis is the same as that under the
previous set of assumptions. At or below 0.4, the safe investment is incentive
compatible and since F<0.5, there is no default; that is, F = D.F o r
D>0.4, the safe investment is no longer incentive compatible, so the bank
takes the risky investment, just as it did without deposit insurance. What
changes, however, isthefacevalueofthedebtandthebank’sexpectedpayoff.
Deposit insurance always makes debtors whole, so there is no longer a need
for a risk premium. Consequently, F = D and the bank’s expected payoff
increases because it has to pay out less when it does well. For D>0.4, the
bank’s expected payoff is
0.5(0.0) + 0.5(1.6 − F)+ I = 0.8 + 0.5D. (4)
Figure 2 describes the bank’s expected payoff as a function of its invest-
mentstrategyanddebtlevel. Thehigherexpectedpayofflevelindicateswhich
investment strategy is incentive compatible at a particular level of debt. For
debtlevelsbelow0.4, thebankchoosesthesafeinvestment, butfordebtlevels
above 0.4, it chooses the risky investment. The bank’s choice of investment
strategies is identical to the previous case without deposit insurance. How-
ever, as can be seen in Figure 2, the bank’s expected payoff exceeds 1.0 for
debt levels exceeding 0.4 and it increases with leverage. The value of the
bank increases with leverage because expected transfers from the government
increase. These expected transfers are considered by the market as part of the
return generated by investment in the bank’s debt. These additional transfers
are sometimes referred to as the value of the deposit insurance put option
(Merton 1977). A put option is the right to sell something at a ﬁxed price. In
this case, the bank has the right to sell its losses at a strike price of zero to
the deposit insurance fund. Because the bank is able to dump its losses on
the insurance fund, the value of its investments increases and, in this example,
this increase accrues entirely to the banker.
In contrast with the second set of assumptions, risk is not reﬂected in the
face value of bank debt, which shuts down the market’s desire to control risk.
The problem is so severe in this example (i.e., with deposit insurance) that
without any restriction on its capital structure, the bank would choose D = 1
and the risky investment strategy. In this example, the loss in output is the
only social cost from deposit insurance. There are, however, additional un-
modeledcostsofdepositinsurance. Forexample, depositinsurancepayments
could require some potentially distorting taxes, while the high returns would
encourage too much entry into banking.E. S. Prescott: Regulating Bank Capital Structure 43
Figure 2 Bank’s Expected Payoff as a Function of Debt under Deposit
Insurance
The solid line lists the bank’s expected payoff as a function of the debt level and given
that it takes the safe investment strategy. The dashed line corresponds to the risky invest-
ment strategy. Both lines are horizontal over lower levels of debt. In these ranges there
is no default and the bank’s expected payoff depends only on the return to its investment.
This is not true at higher levels of debt because of deposit insurance. The price of debt
does not reﬂect the true risk of the bank’s investment. Instead, debt is priced as if it
is risk free because the deposit insurer makes debtors whole by transferring resources to
them in the case of failure. These expected transfers increase with the size of the debt.
Furthermore, from the perspective of the bank and its investors, these transfers are simply
additional returns generated by the bank’s investment strategy. Consequently, the bank’s
expected payoff increases in leverage.
Bank Regulation
Without deposit insurance, the market prices debt to accurately reﬂect risk
and monitors or imposes debt covenants to control risk. These measures align
the bank’s interests with those of society. With deposit insurance, however,
the market has no reason to properly price the risk, to impose limitations on
bank capital structure, or to place restrictive covenants in debt contracts, so
the bank’s interests are not aligned with society’s.
Much of safety and soundness regulation can be viewed as an attempt
by the government to replicate what the market would do in the absence
of government deposit insurance. Capital requirements are the most striking44 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
exampleofthis. Inthenumericalexample,acapitalrequirementof60percent
would eliminate any risk-taking incentives and generate the social optimum.
Itwouldalsopreventbanksfrommaximizingtheirleverageinordertoexploit
the deposit insurance put option. FDICIA seems to acknowledge the dangers
of high leverage when it allows regulators to shut down or limit the activities
of undercapitalized banks.
The parallels between market measures and governmental regulations ex-
tend to other regulations as well. For example, the activities in which banks
may engage are limited. There are prohibitions on the amount of lending a
bank can do to a single entity. Examiners audit and assess bank practices.
Recent proposals that require banks to issue subordinated debt can be
viewed as an attempt to return some of the monitoring role to markets. Unfor-
tunately, much of the discussion about the merits of these proposals focuses
on the signal about risk revealed by prices, as in the example. But as was
discussed in the section about market responses, debtholders not only price
risk but may require covenants or changes such as increased transparency
of investment. For an excellent discussion of the parallels between market
measures and bank regulation, see Black, Miller, and Posner (1978).
2. MORE GENERAL CAPITAL STRUCTURES
The analysis in Section 1 limited the available ﬁnancial instruments to debt
and equity (the latter is really the banker’s own funds). This limitation illus-
trated the corporate ﬁnance principles at work and demonstrated how capital
requirements can work. For some purposes, restricting the analysis to debt
and equity is not limiting. For example, in a Modigliani and Miller world, the
invariance of ﬁrm value to capital structure still holds for more general capital
structures. In the Jensen and Meckling world, however, additional ﬁnancial
instruments can be quite effective at controlling risk, and by extension, these
same ﬁnancial instruments can be effective regulatory tools.
Section 2 builds on the previous analysis by adding a richer return struc-
ture, which brings us a step closer to the full model in Marshall and Prescott
(2001). The new example is ﬁrst studied in the case in which the bank regula-
tory capital requirements can only take the form of minimum equity require-
ments, as under present regulations. Next, the example is studied in the case
in which capital requirements can restrict the entire capital structure; that is,
regulations can require issue of securities other than debt and equity. As will
be shown, much more debt can be issued in the latter case.
Asbefore,thereisdepositinsuranceandthebankcanchooseahigh-mean,
safeinvestmentstrategyoralow-mean,riskyone.8 Now,however,amultitude
8 The example posits a reverse mean-variance tradeoff in investment returns. Marshall and
Prescott (2001) study a more general set of possible investment strategies where the bank choosesE. S. Prescott: Regulating Bank Capital Structure 45
Figure 3 Probability Distribution of Returns
The two lines list the probability distribution of returns for each investment strategy. Both
distributions are approximately normal, though truncated from above and below. The safe
investment strategy has a mean of 1.0 and a low variance. The risky investment strategy
has a mean of 0.95 and a higher variance. If the risky strategy is taken, the return is
much more likely to be very low or high than if the safe strategy is taken.
of returns can be generated. Figure 3 shows the probability distribution of
the returns for each investment strategy. The solid line is the return for the
risky strategy and the dashed line is the return for the safe strategy. The
mean of the risky strategy is 0.95 while the mean of the safe strategy is 1.0.
Both distributions are approximately normal but with differing means and
variances.9
The other difference from the previous section is that the bank is allowed
to lower its return without cost if it so desires. This assumption is reasonable
both the mean and variance of its investment strategy. In that setup, the incentive constraint that
matters the most is the one where the agent deviates to the high-risk, low-mean strategy. The
formulation adopted herein is designed to capture this feature.
9 The distributions were generated in the following way. The set of returns was divided into
an equally spaced grid of 21 points over the range 0.6 to 1.4. The risky investment strategy
probability distribution was created by evaluating each return with a normal distribution of mean
0.95 and standard deviation 0.3. These numbers were then normalized to sum to one in order
to generate a probability distribution. The safe investment strategy was created in the same way
except that the mean is 1.0 and the standard deviation is 0.2.46 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
because it is easy enough to raise costs in order to lower proﬁts. It is also
appealing to make the assumption because it guarantees that the net payoff to
the bank is monotonically increasing in its return, otherwise, the bank would
destroy returns to a point where its net return was highest.10
For each case, we ﬁnd the regulatory policy that is best from society’s
perspective. Because the example leaves out any costs of equity ﬁnance, an
all equity ﬁnanced ﬁrm would face no incentive problem and would receive
no transfers in expectation from the deposit insurer. To avoid this result, I
use as society’s criterion the maximum amount of debt the bank could raise
while keeping the high-mean, safe investment strategy incentive compatible.
This social objective function is sufﬁcient for the purpose of illustrating the
risk-controlfeaturesofwarrantsandsubordinateddebt. MarshallandPrescott
(2001) contains additional features such as liquidity services from bank de-
positsandfranchisevaluethatleadtoadditionalfactorsindeterminingoptimal
capital regulation.
The most debt that can be supported in the minimal equity requirement
case is D = 0.94 with equity equal to 0.06. The bank provides 0.06 of its own
funds to satisfy the capital requirement and raises the rest in deposits. This
quantity is the most highly leveraged capital structure that the bank can have
while still providing an incentive for it to take the safe, high-mean investment.
The expected payoff of the bank is 1.0466, which is greater than 1.0 because
in expectation some transfers are made to the bank from the deposit insurance
fund when the bank fails. Under the assumptions in this example, these extra
funds accrue to the bank’s owner as additional expected proﬁts.
Under more general capital requirements, much more debt can be sup-
ported while keeping the high-mean strategy incentive compatible. The solu-
tion to the general capital structure problem contains much more debt. In this
example, the bank can fund its investment entirely with debt, that is, D = 1.0.
The bank’s expected payoff is 1.0729, reﬂecting the increased transfers from
the government.11 Despite the high leverage, the safe investment is incentive
compatible because of the way payoffs to the bank are structured.
Figure 4 reports the payoff to the bank as a function of the return for both
the minimal equity requirement problem and the general capital regulation
problem. The dashed line lists the payoff for the pure debt and equity case.
It is horizontal at a level of 0.94 from 0.6 to 0.94. For this range of returns,
the bank’s entire payoff comes from its own funds that it invested with the
market at the risk-free rate. Everything produced by the investment project
goes to debtholders. Above 0.94, the investment project begins to pay off for
10 This assumption has no effect on the pure debt and equity case because equity is intrin-
sically monotonically increasing.
11 Since there is nothing that resembles equity when D = 1.0, the return to the bank should
be viewed as payments to the banker for supplying investment services.E. S. Prescott: Regulating Bank Capital Structure 47
Figure 4 Bank’s Payoff as a Function of the Return
The dashed line lists the payoff to the bank if a minimal equity requirement of 0.06 is
imposed on it. For returns above 0.94, the bank’s payoff increases because it has paid off
its debt and keeps the remainder. The solid line lists the payoffs to the bank generated
by the best set of general capital requirements that can be imposed. Under these capital
requirements, the bank issues 1.0 units of debt but cannot keep returns in excess of 1.26.
These returns must be paid to outside investors. By limiting the payoff from high returns,
this payoff structure makes the high-variance investment strategy unappealing.
the bank. All additional returns accrue to the equity holders (the banker) so
their payoff is linear in the return with a slope of one. This payoff structure
is convex, but the 6 percent capital requirement is enough to prevent the bank
from taking the risky investment. However, if the bank issued more debt the
payoff structure would shift to the right, making the payoff structure even
more convex and making the safe strategy no longer incentive compatible.
The solid line lists the payoff structure to the bank that general capital
regulations should try to duplicate. At this point, I only discuss the payoffs,
but later I describe how speciﬁc ﬁnancial instruments can be used to generate
this payoff structure. Over the range of 0.6 to 1.26, the payoff for the general
capital structure case has a similar shape to that of the pure debt and equity
case. Above this range, however, the bank’s payoff is horizontal in the return.
This feature reduces the range of returns over which the bank’s payoff is
convex, which helps to control risk taking. Furthermore, an examination of48 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure3revealsthatlowandhighreturnsaremuchmorelikelyundertherisky
strategy than under the safe strategy. The ratio of the probability of a given
return under the risky strategy to the probability of that return under the safe
strategy is called the likelihood ratio for that return.12 The goal of the capital
structure is to keep payoffs to the bank low when the ratio is high, and to keep
it high when the ratio is low. This payoff structure rewards the safe strategy
relatively more than it rewards the risky strategy if the bank indeed followed
that strategy.
The role of likelihood ratios can be seen more formally. For simplicity,
assume there is a ﬁnite number of returns. Let ps(R) be the probability
of return R if the safe investment strategy is chosen, and let pr(R) be the
corresponding probability if the risky investment is chosen. Also, let u(R) be








This constraint says that the expected payoff the bank receives from the safe
strategymustbeatleastasmuchasitwouldreceiveifittooktheriskystrategy.
If ps(R) is low and pr(R) is high, then it is desirable to set a low u(R).
Conversely, if ps(R) is high and pr(R) is low, then it is desirable to set a high
u(R).
In this example, the likelihood ratio is at its highest level for low returns.
The regulator would like to prevent the bank from taking the risky invest-
ment by lowering the bank’s payoff for these returns as much as possible.
Because of limited liability, however, these payoffs cannot be lowered below
zero. (Recall that the bank still receives payments from its risk-free invest-
ment. This accounts for its positive payoff.) At high returns, this ratio is also
high, but limited liability does not bind so payoffs to the bank are lowered.
Interestingly, it would be desirable to lower payoffs in these returns to zero,
but because of the monotonicity requirement (from the costless destruction of
returns assumption) there are limits to which these returns can be lowered.13
A Capital Structure That Replicates the Payoffs
Figure4describestheoptimalpayoffstructure. Butcanthisstructureberepli-
cated with a combination of ﬁnancial instruments that regulators can require
banks to hold? The answer is yes. One way to do this is for the bank to issue
warrants with a strike price of 1.26. A warrant is an option that gives the
12 See Hart and Holmstrom (1987) for more analysis of likelihood ratios in moral hazard
models.
13 For more details see Marshall and Prescott (2001), who compare solutions with and without
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owner the right to buy shares at the strike price. If the bank produces a return
of more than 1.26, a warrant holder collects the difference between the return
and the strike price by exercising his or her warrant, and the bank receives
just 1.26. This accounts for the ﬂat payoff to the bank for returns above 1.26.
But, more generally, if the exercised warrants make up only a fraction of the
equity, then the bank’s payoffs for returns above 1.26 will increase (though at
a slope less than one).
Selling a warrant is equivalent to selling a portion of the bank’s return
above the strike price; the exact portion depends on the relative share of war-
rants and existing equity. In this example, selling the warrant is valuable
because it allows the bank to be more highly leveraged than in the pure eq-
uity case, while keeping the safe, high-mean strategy incentive compatible.
Furthermore, because the bank can ﬁnance its entire investment with debt,
the income received from selling the warrants is reinvested at the market rate
along with the banker’s own 1.0 units of funds. For this reason, the bank’s
payoff slightly exceeds 1.0 for the range of returns between 0.6 and 1.0.
The analysis contains a clear message about capital regulation. Capital
requirements that control risk by lowering the upper-tail payoff to banks can
improve upon the existing capital regulations. Warrants with a high strike
price are not the only ﬁnancial instruments that can do this. For example,
convertible debt is debt that can be converted into equity at some agreed-upon
price. For a high enough strike price, convertible debt could substitute for
warrants. Alternatively, equity swaps might be possible.
Some Caveats
In assessing different ﬁnancial instruments, it may be important to consider
additional features of ﬁnancial instruments like control features or ability to
trade. If the banker sold warrants at a strike price of 1.26, he or she would
be turning the bank over to the warrant holders whenever the warrants were
exercised. Managers rarely want to give up control. The static analysis in
this article is inappropriate for an analysis of control; however, if control
was indeed an issue, then other ﬁnancial instruments like swaps that separate
control from cash ﬂow might be valuable.
Another point is that in this analysis, it matters who holds the warrants.
In the example, there is an anonymous market that purchases them, but if the
bankerboughtthem, itwouldundohisorherincentivessincehisorherpayoff
structure would then look convex again. In practice it would be necessary to
ensurethatownersofthewarrantsarenotthesamepeoplewhoowntheequity
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3. FINAL COMMENTS
This article argues that ﬁnancial instruments, such as warrants or convertible
debt, should be considered as part of capital regulations. They are effective at
controlling risk-taking incentives because they lower the payoff to a bank that
engages in risky activities without adversely affecting a bank engaged in safe
activities. Furthermore, at least in the example in Section 2, imposing these
requirements would allow a reduction in the traditional capital requirement of
an equity minimum.
While the example necessarily leaves things out, the analysis in Marshall
and Prescott (2001) includes several additional features and still ﬁnds that ﬁ-
nancialinstrumentslikewarrantsandconvertibledebtarepotentiallyvaluable
regulatorytools. Theyincludefranchisevalueanddisutilitytomanagersfrom
screening the quality of its loans. These two features give equity some value
in their environment. They also include a utility value of deposits, which is
designed to capture the payment and liquidity services that deposits provide
but other kinds of debt do not. Furthermore, they allow banks to choose from
a richer set of investment strategies. Banks are allowed to choose the variance
and by screening, the mean, of its investment portfolio.
They ﬁnd that the most binding incentive constraint is the one on the bank
taking the low-mean, high-variance investment. The regulator sets its capital
requirements mainly to prevent the bank from taking this investment strategy.
This reverse mean-variance tradeoff is the justiﬁcation for the simple two
distribution choice faced by banks in this article. For low franchise values,
they ﬁnd results qualitatively very similar to those in this article. Equity
minimumsarehigherunderstandardcapitalrequirementsthanunderacapital
requirement that also uses instruments like warrants with a high strike price.
For higher franchise values, they ﬁnd that capital requirements are not that
important and that the banks will choose high levels of capital, in order to
reduce the chance of bankruptcy.
One important feature that Marshall and Prescott (2001) do not study is
that warrants and convertible debt may punish banks whose high returns are
generated by innovation or just simply better management. The investment
choicesintheirpaper,aswellasinthisarticle,donotcapturethisphenomenon.
Future research should be concerned with determining the efﬁcacy of payoff
structures for these kinds of situations.E. S. Prescott: Regulating Bank Capital Structure 51
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